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Abstract: In spite of the rapidly growing research on fiscal multipliers 
over the recent years, little evidence has been so far accumulated in 
developing and emerging economies. This paper investigates the nature 
and the size of fiscal multipliers in Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEEC). Unlike most of existing literature, we draw upon a 
panel vector error correction model, which appropriately captures the 
common long-term path of CEEC, while allowing for different short-run 
dynamics, in an integrated setup. Our main results show that the spending 
multiplier is positive, but low on average. Moreover, its sign, significance 
and magnitude vary across CEEC. Finally, both impulse and cumulative 
fiscal multipliers are sensitive to a wide range of CEEC characteristics, 
including the exchange rate regime, the level of economic development, 
the fiscal stance, and the openness degree. 
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I. Introduction 
The fiscal multiplier has received a renewed attention since the recent financial crisis 
and the widespread fiscal stimulus implemented by many countries around the world. In spite 
of the rapidly growing research on fiscal multiplier over the recent years, so far little evidence 
has been accumulated in emerging and developing economies.1 
In this paper, we develop the literature by investigating the effect of discretionary 
fiscal change on economic activity in 11 Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC). 
CEEC share some specific characteristics that may affect the multiplier. Specifically, they are 
relatively small open economies with relatively low debt levels, and are currently 
implementing structural reforms that are more or less correlated with the accession to the 
European (Monetary) Union (E(M)U). In this respect, assessing the nature and the size of the 
effects of fiscal stimulus is of great interest to implement a more tailored fiscal policy. 
The contribution of our paper is fourfold. First, unlike the existing literature that relies 
extensively on VAR models, our analysis uses a Panel Vector Error Correction model 
(PVECM), selected for its appealing features for CEEC. Indeed, on the one hand, all CEEC in 
our sample are expected to follow a common dynamic in the long-term, driven by their 
integration process in the E(M)U. As such, drawing upon methods that remove this long-term 
dynamic (for example, through first-differentiation, as this is the case in stationary VAR 
models), would significantly affect the estimation of fiscal multipliers. On the other hand, 
albeit following a common long-run path, CEEC may present different short-run dynamics. 
Models that do not account for such country-heterogeneities (such as PVAR) or abstract of 
the common long-run path (such as individual country-estimated VAR) are equally likely to 
produce biased estimations of fiscal multipliers. Consequently, unlike most studies, we take 
full advantage of the statistical properties of the data, and particularly of co-integration 
between variables, by using an error correction model on a panel data setting. This 
methodology is appropriate for computing both pooled and country-specific fiscal multipliers 
within the same framework, while controlling for the common long-run relationship between 
CEEC. 
Second, a crucial issue is related to the identification of truly exogenous fiscal shocks. 
However, most VAR models rely upon a simple Cholesky-decomposition of shocks, in which 
identification arises from the ordering of variables. In this paper, we draw upon Fatas and 
Mihov (2003, 2006), Afonso et al. (2010) and Agnello et al. (2013), and define spending 
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 The next section discusses the contributions devoted to developing and emerging countries. 
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shocks as the cyclically-adjusted component of government spending. By so doing, we isolate 
an unexpected change in fiscal policy as the source of fiscal shocks. 
Third, we employ genuine (i.e. not interpolated) quarterly data for the period 1999q1-
2013q3. The use of quarterly data to compute multipliers is extremely rare: if we take into 
account the VAR-based literature, Ilzetzki et al. (2013) is such an example. These authors 
state that the use of quarterly data is useful for identifying shocks properly. In addition, 
compared to Ilzetzki et al. (2013), we exploit only one source to collect quarterly data, which 
ensures homogenous data for our panel of CEEC. 
Fourth, after presenting pooled and country-specific multipliers, we explore the 
sensitivity of the effect of fiscal policy by disentangling CEEC across several of their major 
characteristics, namely the exchange rate regime (ERR), the level of economic development, 
the fiscal stance, and the openness degree. 
Our results are as follows. First, we find that impact and four-quarter cumulative 
multipliers are positive and significant for CEEC. Although the size of impact multipliers is 
fairly small, namely between 0.07 and 0.09 (depending on the estimation method), cumulative 
multipliers can be up to four times higher compared to impact multipliers, namely between 
0.21 and 0.31. Second, we unveil significant differences among fiscal multipliers across 
CEEC. Although positive in most countries, impact and cumulative multipliers can be 
statistically not significant or even negative in some CEEC. In addition, the magnitude of 
cumulative multipliers differs by a factor of four between CEEC, and climbs up to a large 
value of 0.7. Third, we show that not accounting for a common (instead of country-
individual) long-term path can leave to important significance and size differences for fiscal 
multipliers in several CEEC of our sample. Finally, both impact and cumulative fiscal 
multipliers are sensitive to CEEC specificities. Albeit the ERR is found to be unimportant for 
output’s response to fiscal shocks on impact, the ERR affects its cumulative response; in 
particular, cumulative multipliers are significant in pegged and floating ERR, and not 
significant in intermediate ERR. Next, both impact and cumulative multipliers are mainly 
significant in relatively less developed CEEC and in CEEC with relatively lower debt-to-GDP 
ratios. Finally, consistent with the predictions of the Mundell-Fleming model, we find that 
cumulative multipliers are significant only in relatively less open CEEC. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II summarizes the findings of 
previous studies. Section III presents the data and outlines the methodology. Section IV 
illustrates the main results. Section V discusses the sensitivity of fiscal multipliers to several 
CEEC structural characteristics, and Section VI concludes. 
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II. Literature review 
The major fiscal stimuli implemented by governments in response to the recent crisis 
reopened the topic of the multiplier in academia.2 As pioneered by Keynes (1936), the 
multiplier predicts a more than 1 to 1 change in GDP following a fiscal shock. However, as 
emphasized by Blanchard and Leigh (2013), the IMF was significantly under-evaluating fiscal 
multipliers. According to Marglin and Spiegler (2013), such conflicting findings are 
engendered by the use of different methodologies, time span, type of government spending, 
and, according to Chahrour et al. (2012), different identification methods for fiscal shocks. 
Indeed, the literature devoted to the estimation of fiscal multipliers is particularly rich, 
and involves the use of many methods. Theoretically, fiscal multipliers can be approached 
using (i) the ISLM model in its static (Hicks, 1937) and dynamic (Blanchard, 1981) forms, (ii) 
RBC models, developed under the New Classical economics (Long and Plosser, 1983), and 
(iii) New Keynesian DSGE models (Gechert and Will, 2012). Econometrically, fiscal 
multipliers can be computed using (i) the Narrative Approach (Romer and Romer, 2010), (ii) 
the Vector AutoRegression (VAR) models (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002), (iii) single-
equations models (Barro and Redlick, 2009), (iv) instrumental variables (Nakamura and 
Steinsson, 2014), (v) panel models (Almunia et al., 2010), and (vi) two-stage residual 
techniques (Agnello et al., 2013). 
Due to the large strand of literature that focused on estimating fiscal multipliers, we 
present in the following the results of the studies that are the closest to our paper, by focusing 
on developing countries. Based on the estimation of elasticities and regressions to isolate 
fiscal shocks, IMF (2008) illustrates spending multipliers of 0.2 (-0.2) after one (two) years. 
Such low spending multipliers equally emerge from the PVAR analysis of Ilzetzki & Végh 
(2008), performed on 27 developing countries, namely 0.6/0.4/0.1 on impact/1st/2nd year. 
More recently, Kraay (2012, 2014) finds a spending multiplier of 0.5 (0.4) based on a sample 
of 29 (102) developing countries, while Ilzetzki et al. (2013) find public consumption 
multipliers equal to -0.03 (0.4) on impact (after 4 quarters). Finally, Minea & Mustea (2015) 
reveal short-lived impact and short-run fiscal multipliers for developing Asian and African 
Mediterranean countries. Overall, these studies emphasize that fiscal multipliers are fairly low 
in developing countries. 
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 At country level, many European countries took up bailout programs (30, 40, and 200 billion euros in France, 
Spain, and Greece, respectively). At supranational level, the EU and the US adopted fiscal packages of roughly 
2% and 5% of their GDP for 2009-2010, respectively. According to the IILS (2011), fiscal stimuli during 2008-
2009 were around 2 trillion USD for the G20 group, 9.1% of 2008 GDP in Asia and the Pacific (excluding Japan 
and South Korea), and 2.6% of 2008 GDP in Latin America and Caribbean. 
 5 
III. Data and Methodology 
We aim at empirically assessing output effects of a discretionary fiscal policy in CEEC. We 
begin by presenting the data, and then we expose the methodology. 
 
3.1. Data 
We use quarterly data for a sample of 11 CEEC over the period 1999q1-2013q3 (see Tables 
A.1a-b in Appendix for the list of countries and descriptive statistics).3 Except for Central 
Government debt, which is measured by the quarterly public sector debt of the World Bank, 
all data are from EUROSTAT. 
Two main reasons justify the choice of quarterly data. First, as compared to annual 
data, the use of quarterly data is crucial for capturing the fact that fiscal authorities can 
respond to output shocks as rapidly as only after one quarter (Ilzetzki et al., 2013). Second, 
quarterly data provide a substantial increase in the number of degrees of freedom compared to 
annual data, an important feature given the relative small time span usually available for 
European post-communist economies (hardly 15 years, in our study). In particular, as pointed 
out by Ilzetzki et al. (2013), interpolated quarterly data may lead to spurious regressions 
since, by construction, the interpolation creates a strong correlation between government 
spending and output. Thus, we use only genuine quarterly data, namely data that were 
originally collected at quarterly frequency.4 
Our main variables are the gross domestic product (GDP), the total government 
expenditure, defined as the sum of the general government final consumption and gross fixed 
capital formation, and taxes, which include taxes on imports and exports less subsidies. Prior 
to their use in regressions, all variables are deflated by the consumer index (CPI) and 
seasonally adjusted using a moving-average filter. 
 
3.2. Time series properties of variables 
We explore time series properties of variables using three types of panel unit root 
tests. On the one hand, the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Fisher-type test of Choi (2001) 
and the Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS, 2003) unit root test, which both assume the null 
hypothesis that all panels contain a unit root against the alternative of at least one stationary 
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 Although collected data cover the period 1992q2-2013q3, our sample starts in 1999q1 for several reasons. First, 
we allow CEEC to stabilize from the major imbalances engendered by the end of the Cold War. Second, we 
obtain a balanced sample with data collected at quarterly frequency. 
4
 Most EU countries comply with the Common statistical standard in the European Monetary Union (ESA95), 
which encourages the collection of fiscal data at quarterly frequency. As such, CEEC in our sample started 
collecting quarterly-frequency data only since 1995. 
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panel. Compared to alternative tests (such as Levin, Lin and Chu, 2002), these tests present 
the advantages of allowing the autoregressive parameter to be country-specific and of not 
requiring panels to be strongly balanced. On the other hand, to account for the presence of a 
relatively weak number of countries and time dimension, which is inherent when analyzing 
CEEC, we equally draw upon the Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) unit root test. 
Provided variables are integrated of the same order, we test in the following for 
cointegration. For this purpose, we revert to the cointegration tests coined by Westerlund 
(2007), which extend to panel data the time series test of Banerjee et al. (1998). These tests 
assume the null hypothesis of no cointegration. In particular, compared to alternative tests 
(such as, for example, the residual-based test of Pedroni, 2004), Westerlund (2007) tests were 
selected on the basis of allowing individual short-run dynamics and for remaining consistent 
in the presence of possibly serial-correlated errors and weak exogenous regressors. 
 
3.3. The econometric model 
In this sub-section, we discuss the error correction specification and the choice of the 
appropriate estimator. The use of the error correction framework can be justified both 
empirically and theoretically. 
Empirically, the choice of the appropriate model strongly depends upon the statistical 
properties of the data. The existing literature on fiscal multipliers extensively resorts to the 
VAR methodology, either with country or panel data. However, the use of an error correction 
model is suitable when series are non stationary and cointegrated, as this is the case in our 
analysis. 
From a theoretical standpoint, it is not unreasonable to assume that the effect of fiscal 
policy on output is not independent of the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium, all 
the more given the common long-term path of CEEC, driven by their integration process in 
the E(M)U (see Nenovsky and Villieu, 2011). Therefore, it is suitable to account for the long-
run equilibrium when assessing the response of output to the fiscal impulse. 
In line with Pesaran et al. (1999), we assume an autoregressive distributed lag model 
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with Ni ,1=  countries, Tt ,1=  periods, gdp  the log of real GDP, itx  the vector of 
explanatory variables, namely the log of government expenditure and of tax revenues, iµ  
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country-specific fixed effects, and itε  the error term. Since our goal is to evaluate the effect of 
government spending on output, it is necessary to include taxes as a control variable, as 
spending are not independent of taxes (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002).5 
Assuming that variables are I(1) and cointegrated, we reparameterise model (1) into 





























































* δδ . The 
first part of (2)–in levels–captures the long-run relationship, while the second part–in 
differences–illustrates the short-run adjustment to the long-run equilibrium. Parameter iφ  is 
the error-correcting term and measures the speed of adjustment. To validate the existence of a 
long-run relationship, this parameter should be negative and significant. 
The literature suggests three main approaches for the estimation of model (2): (i) the 
dynamic fixed effect (DFE) estimator uses pooled data and allows the intercept to differ 
across groups; however, if the assumption of the common slope fails to hold, then the 
estimator is inconsistent; (ii) the pooling mean group estimator (PMG) combines both pooling 
and averaging; it assumes long-run coefficients to be equal across groups, but allows short-
run coefficients to differ across groups, and (iii) the mean group (MG) estimator, which 
allows intercepts, slope coefficients and errors variances to differ across groups (Pesaran and 
Smith, 1995). In this paper, since we aim at capturing long-term dynamics, we start by using 
the DFE estimator. Then, we draw upon previous evidence and econometric tests to make the 
case for the use of the PMG estimator as the most appropriate for our sample of CEEC. 
Indeed, the use of the PMG estimator will allow assessing the short-run dynamic of countries, 
while controlling for the long-run relationship between spending and output. 
 
3.4. Building a measure of discretionary expenditure shocks 
The main feature of the error correction model (2) is that short-run dynamics of variables are 
influenced by deviations from the long-run equilibrium. Thus, short-run coefficients capture 
output’s responsiveness to fiscal policy adjustments with respect to the long-run equilibrium. 
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 Prior to the adoption of this specification, we performed several estimations that included inflation, the real 
exchange rate or the interest rate as control variables. Since the inclusion of these controls does not significantly 
affect the coefficients of interest, we opted for this more parsimonious specification that has the merit of 
preserving substantial degrees of freedom, thus limiting the danger of biased estimates (see Pesaran and Smith, 
1995). 
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However, there is no reason to believe that observed variations in fiscal policy are exogenous 
or unexpected. Thus, to compute output’s response to unexpected government spending 
changes, we follow the methodology of Fatas and Mihov (2003, 2006), Afonso et al. (2010) 
and Agnello et al. (2013), and construct a measure of discretionary fiscal policy as follows. 
Assuming that public spending can be decomposed into a structural (anticipated) and a 
residual (non-anticipated) component, we define discretionary spending shocks as the 
cyclically-adjusted component of government spending, which reflects unexpected fiscal 
policy changes. For each of 11 CEEC in our sample, we estimate the following model using 
quarterly data over the period 1999q1-2013q3 
( ) ( ) itititiitiitiiit trenddebtogapGG εξδγβα +++++= −1loglog ,   (3) 
with G  total government spending, ogap  the output gap (based on the Hodrick-Prescott-
filtered log of real GDP), debt  the central government debt in % of GDP, and trend  the time 
trend. Consequently, we capture spending shocks through the residuals ε . 
Equation (3) differs from the specification of Fatas and Mihov (2003) and Agnello et 
al. (2013). Indeed, following Blanchard (1993), and closely related Fatas and Mihov (2006), 
we estimate equation (3) in levels. In addition, compared to Fatas and Mihov (2006) who use 
GDP growth, we employ the output gap to capture the business cycle, for the following 
reasons. Output gap has the advantage of controlling for the degree of inflation pressure. 
Next, it also captures the state of unemployment, because a zero output gap corresponds to 
full employment. Moreover, a negative output gap suggests the existence of available excess 
capacities, while the crowding-out of private investment may be independent of the sign of 
the GDP growth rate. Finally, we control for fiscal policy sustainability and for the 
persistence of the responsiveness of fiscal policy to the business cycle, using the debt-to-GDP 
ratio and lagged government spending, respectively. 
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IV. Fiscal multipliers in CEEC: Main results 
 
4.1. Stationarity and cointegration 
To assess the stationarity of our main variables, we report in Table 1 the results of the Fisher-
ADF, IPS and LLC unit root tests. We include in the auto-regressive specification of each test 
both the trend and the intercept, to test for both difference and trend stationarity. As illustrated 
by Table 1, the log of real GDP, total government expenditure and tax revenues are 
nonstationary, since, irrespective of the test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of the 
presence of a unit root. In addition, as emphasized by low p-values, these variables are 
stationary in first-difference, once again irrespective of the considered test. Since variables are 
integrated of the same order, we look in the following for potential cointegration relations 
among them. 
Table 1: Unit root tests 
Variables ADF IPS LLC 
 Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value 
Z: 3.78 0.99 W-T-bar: 3.61 0.99 T*: 2.11 0.98 Log(real GDP) 
Pm: -0.21 0.58     
Z: -3.12 0.00 W-T-bar: -3.30 0.00 T*: -7.20 0.00 D(Log of real GDP) 
Pm: 6.51 0.00     
Z: 5.11 1.00 W-T-bar: 5.23 1.00 T*: 0.84 0.80 Log(Total Government Expenditures) 
Pm: -2.34 0.99     
Z: -2.04 0.02 W-T-bar: -2.05 0.01 T*:-7.70 0.00 D(Log(Total Government Expenditures)) 
Pm: 2.13 0.01     
Z: 2.56 0.99 W-T-bar: 2.18 0.98 T*: 2.80 0.99 Log(Taxes revenues) 
Pm: -2.19 0.98     
Z: -9.50 0.00 W-T-bar: -14.4 0.00 T*: -15.93 0.00 D(Log(Taxes revenues)) 
Pm: 19.1 0.00     
Note: Z is the inverse normal statistic, Pm is the modified inverse chi-squared. The null hypothesis is “all panel 
contain a unit root”. The specification includes a trend and an intercept. We use 4 lags following the AIC test. 
 
To assess cointegration, we draw upon Westerlund’s (2007) tests. These tests assume 
the null hypothesis of no cointegration, against four different specifications of the alternative 
hypothesis: the group mean test and its asymptotic version, which consider the alternative 
hypothesis that the panel is cointegrated as a whole, and the panel mean test and its 
asymptotic version, which consider the alternative hypothesis that there is at least one cross-
section unit for which the series are cointegrated. To preserve the consistency and the size 
accuracy in the case of cross-sectional dependence, we carry out the tests using bootstrap with 
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1000 replications. Table 2 provides the results of testing for a potential cointegration 
relationship between real GDP, government expenditure and taxes. Irrespective of the 
considered test, low p-values in Table 2 support the presence of cointegration between 
variables. 
Table 2: Westerlund (2007) cointegration tests 
Statistic Value Z-value P-value 
Gt -2.896 -3.100 0.003 
Ga -13.982 -2.568 0.003 
Pt -8.476 -2.706 0.033 
Pa -10.233 -2.591 0.039 
Note: Gt and Pt are respectively the group mean test and the panel mean test. Ga and Pa refer to the asymptotic 
version of the test. The null hypothesis is “no cointegration”. We use 3 lags following the AIC test. 
 
Given that series in level are all I(1) and co-integrated, we will draw in the following 
upon an error correction models to compute output’s response to spending shocks. 
 
4.2. Fiscal multipliers in CEEC countries: full sample 
To estimate fiscal multipliers, we proceed in three steps. First, we isolate public spending 
shocks. Table 3 illustrates the results of the OLS estimation of equation (3), for each of the 11 
CEEC in our sample.6 As signalled by positively-significant coefficients of output gap, 
government expenditure is pro-cyclical in all (but Croatia) CEEC in our sample, consistent 
with previous evidence on developing and emerging countries (see Dalic, 2013). Furthermore, 
non significant or positive debt coefficients suggest that the adjustment in response to 
indebtedness takes place more likely through an adjustment of taxes than of public spending. 
Finally, irrespective of the considered country, fairly high R2 values support the quality of our 
specification for purging most of anticipated public spending, and isolate public spending 
shocks through the country-specific error terms. 
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 Fatas and Mihov (2003) noticed that using OLS or IV in this first-stage regression leads to comparable results. 
We tested several specifications, in which output gap is generated alternatively using one and three GDP lags, to 
avoid reverse causality. We report that we did not unveil significant changes in our results (estimations are 
available upon request). 
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Table 3: Estimates of the discretionary component of the fiscal policy 
Dependent variable: Bulgaria Croatia Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia 
Log(Total Government expenditure)            
                        
Log(Total Government expenditure),t-1 0.882*** 1.100*** 0.740*** 0.968*** 0.745*** 0.857*** 0.905*** 0.682*** 0.526*** 0.765*** 0.846*** 
 (0.0999) (0.0393) (0.0999) (0.0476) (0.0817) (0.0846) (0.0848) (0.0949) (0.0747) (0.0932) (0.0686) 
Output gap 1.134** 0.00541 0.541*** 0.339** 0.826*** 0.327* 0.475** 0.568*** 1.464*** 0.512** 0.441* 
 (0.552) (0.180) (0.187) (0.161) (0.267) (0.173) (0.222) (0.195) (0.273) (0.226) (0.259) 
Real debt of the central government % GDP 0.0192  0.0237* 0.238*** 0.0247** -0.0291 0.0322 -0.0321 0.0609 -5.67e-05 -0.0105 
 (0.0116)  (0.0125) (0.0725) (0.0106) (0.0390) (0.0227) (0.0199) (0.0547) (0.0118) (0.0133) 
Time trend 0.00197 -0.00237*** 0.00263* -0.00114 -0.00207*** 0.00122 0.000443 0.00382*** 0.00213** 0.00286*** 0.000267 
 (0.00214) (0.000546) (0.00149) (0.000791) (0.000685) (0.00180) (0.00158) (0.00134) (0.000976) (0.000998) (0.000366) 
Constant 1.878 -1.617** 4.676** 0.541 4.703*** 2.318* 1.555 5.991*** 8.542*** 3.998** 2.662** 
 (1.581) (0.658) (1.783) (0.740) (1.493) (1.324) (1.354) (1.792) (1.339) (1.610) (1.180) 
            
Observations 46 42 50 51 51 51 51 51 43 50 51 
Adjusted R-squared 0.969 0.991 0.992 0.988 0.877 0.960 0.981 0.936 0.960 0.980 0.951 
F-stat 348.9 1488 1457 1053 89.78 301.8 643.8 183.3 255.0 607.5 245.9 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Debt data is unavailable for Croatia. 
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Second, we use these recovered shocks as a measure of unanticipated public spending 
in the estimation of the error correction model. However, drawing upon residuals from 
another equation in the error correction model may lead to biased estimates. Therefore, we 
correct standard errors using the Jackknife resampling procedure, which consists of repeatedly 
computing standard errors, by omitting each time one observation.7 In our specific case, to 
take into account both individual and time variability, the statistics are computed leaving out 
one country.8 
The first column of Table 4 reports the results of the error correction model used to 
compute the effects of unanticipated public expenditure on output for the full sample of 11 
CEEC, based on the dynamic fixed effect (DFE) estimator with four lags, as suggested by 
AIC tests. Several points must be highlighted. The error correction term is significant and 
negative, thus supporting our modelling strategy. Next, the fourth lag of unexpected 
expenditure is significant, consistent with the tests for the choice of the optimal lag. Finally, 
our strategy of controlling for tax revenues is supported by their significant coefficients. 
Based on this model, we compute in the following fiscal multipliers. 
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 Note that performing a standard bootstrap would underestimate time variability in our analysis. 
8
 In addition, this procedure allows detecting outliers using Jackknife pseudo-values (Mooney and Duval, 1993). 
This is a particularly appealing feature, given that the estimator we use is sensitive to outliers especially when 
the cross-section dimension is weak (Pesaran et al., 1999). 
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Table 4: Output’s response to fiscal policy 
  
DFE PMG 
Long Run   
Log(Real GDP)   
Error correction term -0.0386*** -0.0375* 
 (0.0121) (0.0220) 
Log(Total Government expenditure) 0.223 0.829*** 
 (0.326) (0.0652) 
Log(Tax revenues) 0.545** -0.231*** 
 (0.262) (0.0763) 
Short Run   
D(Log(Real GDP))   
D(Log(Real GDP),t-1) 0.796*** 0.626*** 
 (0.0543) (0.0701) 
D(Log(Real GDP),t-2) -0.759*** -0.183* 
 (0.0597) (0.0962) 
D(Log(Real GDP),t-3) 0.659*** 0.216*** 
 (0.0684) (0.0681) 
D(Log(Real GDP),t-4) 0.0516 -0.00700 
 (0.0575) (0.0781) 
D(Log(Unexpected Government expenditure)) 0.0283*** 0.0401*** 
 (0.00759) (0.0112) 
D(Log(Unexpected Government expenditure),t-1) 0.00755 -0.00515 
 (0.00906) (0.00879) 
D(Log(Unexpected Government expenditure),t-2) 0.0465*** 0.0109 
 (0.00820) (0.00719) 
D(Log(Unexpected Government expenditure),t-3) 0.0141 0.0189 
 (0.0114) (0.0119) 
D(Log(Unexpected Government expenditure),t-4) 0.0358*** 0.0253*** 
 (0.00447) (0.00416) 
D(Log(Tax revenues)) 0.220*** 0.221*** 
 (0.0312) (0.0283) 
D(Log(Tax revenues),t-1) -0.0589*** -0.00177 
 (0.0203) (0.0219) 
D(Log(Tax revenues),t-2) 0.0954*** -0.0101 
 (0.0211) (0.0177) 
D(Log(Tax revenues),t-3) -0.0744*** 0.000766 
 (0.0197) (0.0243) 
D(Log(Tax revenues),t-4) -0.0909** 0.00451 
 (0.0425) (0.0292) 
Constant 0.219*** 0.294* 
 (0.0599) (0.169) 
Observations 482 482 
Number of countries 11 11 
Log Likelihood  1942 
Hausman Test p-value  0.1842 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Total government expenditure captures the 
discretionary component of government spending (the residuals of equation (3)). Standard errors are corrected 
using the Jackknife procedure. The null hypothesis of the Hausman test is that countries share a common long-
run trend. The p-value of this test equals 0.18, thus accepting the null hypothesis and suggesting that the PMG 
estimator is preferred. 
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The third and last step consists of computing fiscal multipliers. Following the related 
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M 44



















For the full sample model, 028300 .m =  (see Table 4) and ( ) 42800.Y/G =  (see Table 
A.2a in the Appendix), leading to an impact multiplier equal to 0.07. Since the multiplier is 
significant (see Table 5), we find that, in other words, an increase of 1 unit in government 
expenditure increases GDP by 0.07 units. In addition, to account for a possible delay in 
output’s response to the fiscal stimulus, we compute the cumulative multiplier. Given that 
132304 .M =  (see Table 4), the one-year cumulative multipliers equals 0.31 (and is 
significant, see Table 5). These findings call for two remarks. 
First, although spending multipliers are positive and significant, their magnitude is 
weak. As such our results for emerging CEEC are consistent with previous studies 
emphasizing fairly small multipliers in developing countries. 
Second, note that these values are based on the DFE estimator. However, this 
estimator rests on the assumption that all CEEC in our sample share a common long-term 
path and a common short-run dynamic. Regarding the latter, there are several reasons making 
the assumption of a common short-run dynamic unrealistic. Indeed, for example, given that 
some CEEC in our sample integrated the EU in 2004, others in 2007, and other did not 
integrate the EU yet, and the fact that our sample mixes CEEC that adopted the euro with 
CEEC that did not, we allow in the following for different short-run dynamics for the CEEC 
in our sample. Regarding the former assumption, we draw upon the Hausman Chi-2 test, 
which tests the null hypothesis of a common long-term coefficient against the alternative of 
different coefficients. Based on the associated p-value equal to 0.18 (see the bottom of Table 
4), we accept the null hypothesis of a common long-term path for the CEEC in our sample. 
Consequently, in the following, our baseline specification assumes a common long-term path 
and different short-run dynamics, by using the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator. 
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PMG-based estimated impact and cumulative multipliers equal 0.09 and 0.21, 
respectively, and are significant. Thus, accounting for different short-run dynamics slightly 
increases output’s response on impact, but decreases it by roughly one-third cumulated for 
four quarters. In what follows, we draw upon PMG estimators to compute country-specific 
fiscal multipliers. 
Table 5: Impact and cumulative fiscal multipliers for the full sample 
 Dynamic Fixed Effects (DFE) Pooling Mean Group (PMG) 
Multiplier Value Std Dev Value Std Dev 
Impact 0.07*** 0.01 0.09*** 0.02 
Cumulative 0.31*** 0.07 0.21** 0.07 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
4.3. Fiscal multipliers in CEEC: country-evidence 
One of the key contributions of this paper is to provide both full sample (aggregate) 
and country estimates of the fiscal multiplier within a unique framework. Based on PMG 
estimations of the effect of public expenditure on output (see Table 6), Table 7 reports fiscal 
multipliers for each of the 11 CEEC in our sample (Table A.2a in the Appendix presents 




Table 6: Pooling Mean Group (PMG) country-estimates of the effect of public spending on output 
  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
 Short run coefficient by country   LR 
Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth Bulgaria Croatia Czech R. Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia  
Log(Real GDP)             
Log(Total Government Expenditure)            0.813*** 
            (0.0702) 
Log(Tax revenues)            -0.221*** 
             (0.0823) 
Error correction term -0.119*** -0.0940*** 0.000599 -0.0227** -0.0578** -0.0243* -0.0578*** -0.0279* -0.176*** -0.00662 -0.0508**  
 (0.0368) (0.0240) (0.00480) (0.00900) (0.0247) (0.0135) (0.0131) (0.0145) (0.0396) (0.00915) (0.0219)  
D(Log(Real GDP))             
D(Log(Real GDP),t-1) 0.725*** 0.264* 1.023*** 0.403** 0.879*** 0.765*** 0.505*** 0.646*** 0.491*** 0.925*** 0.471***  
 (0.137) (0.139) (0.153) (0.160) (0.144) (0.146) (0.123) (0.155) (0.128) (0.152) (0.107)  
D(Log(Real GDP),t-2) -0.575*** -0.0670 -0.417 0.317* -0.364* -0.232 0.0587 -0.0642 -0.542*** -0.546*** -0.160  
 (0.189) (0.135) (0.254) (0.188) (0.194) (0.156) (0.148) (0.205) (0.164) (0.181) (0.115)  
D(Log(Real GDP),t-3) 0.640*** 0.242** 0.391 -0.0865 0.334* 0.358** -0.0993 0.209 0.227 0.505*** 0.124  
 (0.177) (0.119) (0.241) (0.180) (0.193) (0.157) (0.148) (0.183) (0.204) (0.191) (0.115)  
D(Log(Real GDP),t-4) 0.365* -0.257*** -0.0208 -0.175 -0.226* -0.290** 0.00684 -0.181 0.399*** -0.169 0.387***  
 (0.200) (0.0843) (0.143) (0.140) (0.134) (0.121) (0.130) (0.127) (0.152) (0.153) (0.0986)  
D(Log(Unexpected Government Expenditure)) 0.00652 0.0598*** 0.0975*** 0.0465*** 0.0249 0.0122 0.0619*** 0.0470*** -0.0214 0.0384 0.0818***  
 (0.0153) (0.0102) (0.0264) (0.0113) (0.0169) (0.0129) (0.0146) (0.0112) (0.0181) (0.0239) (0.0151)  
D(Log(unexpected Government expenditure),t-1) 0.0159 -0.0172 0.0130 0.0201 -0.0152 -0.0285** 0.0174 0.0133 -0.0726*** -0.0553*** 0.00515  
 (0.0157) (0.0129) (0.0287) (0.0129) (0.0167) (0.0124) (0.0182) (0.0148) (0.0182) (0.0202) (0.0179)  
D(Log(Unexpected Government expenditure),t-2) 0.0211 -0.00433 0.0945*** -0.000310 0.0137 -0.0103 -0.0103 0.0441*** 0.00902 0.0488** 7.50e-05  
 (0.0139) (0.0163) (0.0248) (0.0121) (0.0190) (0.0127) (0.0170) (0.0154) (0.0222) (0.0241) (0.0180)  
D(Log(Unexpected Government expenditure),t-3) 0.0170 -0.0428*** 0.0832*** 0.0508*** 0.0115 -0.0200* 0.0432*** 0.00540 -0.0276 -0.0104 0.0433**  
 (0.0115) (0.0154) (0.0248) (0.00904) (0.0158) (0.0119) (0.0160) (0.0130) (0.0226) (0.0214) (0.0177)  
D(Log(Unexpected Government expenditure),t-4) 0.0292*** 0.0153 0.0436* 0.0371*** 0.0172 0.0428*** 0.0367*** 0.0432*** 0.0163 0.0326 -0.00970  
 (0.00973) (0.0132) (0.0247) (0.0111) (0.0190) (0.0120) (0.0109) (0.0127) (0.0185) (0.0214) (0.0145)  
D(Log(Tax revenues)) 0.122*** 0.350*** 0.0890** 0.173*** 0.247*** 0.229*** 0.242*** 0.241*** 0.366*** 0.124** 0.244***  
 (0.0467) (0.0361) (0.0415) (0.0300) (0.0744) (0.0387) (0.0539) (0.0491) (0.0701) (0.0485) (0.0453)  
D(Log(Tax revenues),t-1) -0.145** 0.133** 9.90e-05 -0.0639 -0.0400 -0.0176 0.0913 0.0267 0.0356 -0.0382 0.0644  
 (0.0610) (0.0618) (0.0463) (0.0403) (0.0777) (0.0494) (0.0612) (0.0608) (0.0909) (0.0521) (0.0418)  
D(Log(Tax revenues),t-2) 0.0921 -0.0435 -0.0671 0.0392 -0.0614 0.0732 -0.00154 -0.0823 -0.0295 0.00764 -0.0358  
 (0.0723) (0.0592) (0.0507) (0.0451) (0.0818) (0.0470) (0.0605) (0.0579) (0.0596) (0.0589) (0.0401)  
D(Log(Tax revenues),t-3) -0.0866 0.151*** -0.0439 0.131*** -0.0642 -0.0135 -0.110* -0.0234 0.0492 -0.00398 0.0440  
 (0.0710) (0.0470) (0.0490) (0.0420) (0.0798) (0.0464) (0.0588) (0.0562) (0.0534) (0.0532) (0.0395)  
D(Log(Tax revenues),t-4) 0.000854 0.136*** -0.0807* 0.0989** 0.107 -0.0399 0.0365 0.0160 -0.127** 0.0669 -0.178***  
 (0.0542) (0.0490) (0.0475) (0.0386) (0.0771) (0.0457) (0.0650) (0.0520) (0.0612) (0.0560) (0.0369)  
Constant -0.899*** 0.731*** -0.00248 0.161** 0.465** 0.177* 0.434*** 0.241* 1.412*** 0.0538 0.387**  
 (0.272) (0.182) (0.0383) (0.0630) (0.198) (0.0975) (0.0960) (0.124) (0.295) (0.0696) (0.169)  
Observations 482 
Log likelihood 1939 
Number of countries 11 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Total government expenditure captures the discretionary component of government spending. 
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Table 7a: Fiscal multipliers by country (PMG estimator) 
Multiplier Impact Std dev Cumulative Std dev 
Bulgaria 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.10 
Croatia 0.13*** 0.02 0.07 0.10 
Czech Republic 0.21*** 0.04 0.68*** 0.16 
Estonia 0.10*** 0.02 0.29*** 0.05 
Hungary 0.06* 0.04 0.07 0.13 
Latvia 0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.09 
Lithuania 0.15*** 0.03 0.34** 0.11 
Poland 0.12** 0.03 0.35** 0.11 
Romania  -0.05* 0.03 -0.18** 0.08 
Slovakia 0.09** 0.04 -0.01 0.10 
Slovenia  0.19*** 0.03 0.29** 0.09 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Analogous to estimations for the pooled sample, we present results for both impact 
and cumulative multipliers. Let us discuss impact multipliers. First, regarding sign 
differences, although most multipliers are positive, we equally reveal statistically not 
significant multipliers (for example, in Bulgaria or Latvia), and even a negative impact 
multiplier in Romania (albeit weakly significant). Second, we emphasize magnitude 
differences across multipliers in CEEC: for example, the impact multiplier in Czech Republic 
and Slovenia is roughly four times higher compared to Romania (in absolute value), and 
roughly two times higher if we stick to significant positive multipliers, for example in Estonia 
and Poland. 
Such sign and magnitude heterogeneities equally arise if we consider the cumulated 
response of GDP to fiscal shocks after four quarters. On the one hand, cumulative multipliers 
are positive in most countries, and remain non significant in Bulgaria or Hungary. However, 
we now find negative multipliers in three out of the eleven countries of our sample, namely 
Latvia, Romania and Slovakia. On the other hand, the magnitude of cumulative multipliers is 
stronger compared to impact multipliers; for example, the multiplier is around 0.3 in four 
countries (Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia), and even as high as 0.7 in Czech 
Republic. 
These results call for two remarks. On the one hand, recall that multipliers were 
computed based on a model that assumed a common long-term path and different short-run 
dynamics among CEEC. If the fact of not accounting for the long-term path (for example, like 
in PVAR models) is an obvious drawback, we can illustrate the differences induced by not 
accounting for a common trend by comparing our results with mean group (MG) estimates, 
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which assume different long-term paths (in addition to different short-run dynamics) among 
CEEC (see Table A.5 in the Appendix for MG estimated coefficients). 
Table 7b: Fiscal multipliers by country (MG estimator) 
Multiplier Impact Std dev Cumulative Std dev 
Bulgaria -0.04 0.04 0.07 0.12 
Croatia 0.13*** 0.03 0.02 0.16 
Czech Republic 0.05 0.06 -0.05 0.26 
Estonia 0.10** 0.03 0.32*** 0.07 
Hungary 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.19 
Latvia 0.11** 0.04 0.41** 0.18 
Lithuania 0.17*** 0.04 0.55** 0.18 
Poland 0.11** 0.04 0.31** 0.15 
Romania -0.01 0.05 0.06 0.15 
Slovakia 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.15 
Slovenia 0.15** 0.04 0.26** 0.13 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Compared to Table 7a, Table 7b emphasizes significant difference for both impact and 
cumulative multipliers. Focusing on impact multipliers, not accounting for a common long-
term path would (i) overestimate their significance in Latvia and underestimate it in Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, and, to some extent, in Romania, and (ii) overestimate their size in Latvia 
and underestimate it in Czech Republic and Slovakia. These differences are reinforced 
regarding cumulative multipliers. For example, not accounting for a common long-term path 
would (i) overestimate their significance in Latvia and underestimate it in Czech Republic, 
Romania and Slovakia, and (ii) overestimate their size in Latvia and Lithuania, and 
underestimate it in Czech Republic and in Romania (particularly for Romania, the estimated 
coefficient would be positive, instead of significantly negative). 
On the other hand, country-evidence unveils important short-run heterogeneities 
across CEEC. Consistent with the standard ISLM model, we emphasize Keynesian effects of 
fiscal policy both on impact and after one year, in most of CEEC in our sample. However, in 
several countries we do not find significant multipliers, neither on impact (for example, in 
Bulgaria and Hungary), nor cumulated after four quarters (for example, in Bulgaria and 
Latvia), in line with the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem of Barro (1974). In addition, we 
even find anti-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy on output, in the form of negative multipliers 
(for example, in Romania on impact, and in Latvia, Romania and Slovakia cumulated after 
four quarters). Thus, even if CEEC are expected to converge in the long-run towards a 
common steady-state, the dynamic of their output following fiscal shocks might be quite 
different. This calls for a closer look at specificities at work in CEEC. 
 19 
V. Fiscal multipliers in CEEC: Conditionality upon structural characteristics 
Heterogeneities in output’s response to fiscal policy unveiled in the previous section are 
probably related to economic and structural differences among CEEC. In the following, we 
analyze the sensitivity of multipliers to such differences. 
We consider four structural characteristics of CEEC. First, we seize differences in 
monetary policy by considering alternatively countries with fixed (pegged), intermediate and 
flexible exchange rate regime (ERR), using the classification of Ilzetzki et al. (2010) reported 
in Table A.3 in the Appendix. Second, to account for the level of economic development, we 
divide CEEC using the level of income (average over 1999:q1-2013:q3), into low- and high-
income CEEC, respectively. Third, we capture the fiscal stance using the public debt9 to 
distinguish among low-debt CEEC (with a debt ratio of 22% of GDP on average over 
1999:q1-2013:q3) and high-debt CEEC (with an average debt ratio of 48% of GDP for the 
same period).10 Finally, we take into account the openness degree using the level of exports in 
percentage of GDP, and, accordingly, we divide CEEC into countries with relatively low and 
high openness degree, respectively. Table 8 presents the countries in each group. 
Table 8: List of groups of countries based on CEEC’ structural characteristics 
 Exchange Rate Regime (ERR) Level of income Public Debt (%GDP) Openness degree (%GDP) 
 Pegged Intermediate Floating Low High Low High Low High 
Group mean - - - 5.25e+07 2.84e+08 22.42 48.29 45.11 69.25 
 Bulgaria Croatia Poland Bulgaria Czech R. Czech R. Bulgaria Bulgaria Czech R. 
 Estonia Czech R. Romania Croatia Hungary Estonia Croatia Croatia Estonia 
 Lithuania Hungary  Estonia Poland Latvia Hungary Latvia Hungary 
 Slovenia Latvia  Latvia Romania Lithuania Poland Lithuania Slovakia 
  Slovakia  Lithuania Slovakia Romania Slovakia Poland Slovenia 
  Slovenia  Slovenia  Slovenia  Romania  
 
Based on Table 8, Table 9 presents the estimations of the effect of unexpected 
government spending on output using the PMG estimator,11 and Table 10 reports the 
associated multipliers (Table A.2b in the Appendix presents descriptive statistics for each 
group of countries). 
 
                                                           
9
 We use the gross consolidated debt of the central government (the same measures is used, for example, by 
Ilzetzki et al., 2013). 
10
 We split countries based on the median public debt to GDP ratio for the sample period 1999:q1-2013:q3. 
Considering median public debt, instead of an exogenous threshold of 60% (as suggested by the Maastricht 
Treaty), is justified by the fact that in our sample only Hungary presents a debt ratio above this threshold. 
11
 Since the lag structure changes across structural characteristics, and due to the loses in degrees of freedom, we 
set the number of lags equal to 4 (the same is done by Ilzetzki et al., 2013, in their analysis based on quarterly 
data). 
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Table 9: PMG estimates of the effect of unexpected government spending on output when accounting for CEEC’ structural characteristics 
  Exchange Rate Regime (ERR) Level of income Public debt (% of GDP) Openness degree 
  
Full 
model Pegged Intermediate Floating Low High Low High Low High 
Long Run                     
Log(Real GDP)           
Error correction term -0.0375* -0.0121 -0.182** 0.0452 -0.0260 -0.170*** -0.0766 -0.0905** 0.0101 -0.125 
 (0.0220) (0.0414) (0.0751) (0.0769) (0.0328) (0.0551) (0.0845) (0.0418) (0.00907) (0.0777) 
Log(Total Government Expenditure) 0.829*** 1.146*** 0.772*** 0.809*** 0.899*** 0.130*** 0.677*** 0.281*** 2.779 0.581*** 
 (0.0652) (0.107) (0.0314) (0.114) (0.0559) (0.0502) (0.0373) (0.0918) (1.827) (0.0615) 
Log(Tax revenues) -0.231*** -0.517*** 0.272*** 0.258** -0.289*** 0.736*** 0.332*** 0.611*** -1.872 0.405*** 
 (0.0763) (0.110) (0.0235) (0.123) (0.0670) (0.0456) (0.0293) (0.0961) (1.975) (0.0470) 
Short Run           
Control for Real GDP (up until the lag 4) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
D(Log(Unexpected Government Expenditure)) 0.0401*** 0.0510*** 0.0347** 0.0541*** 0.0479*** 0.0245* 0.0481*** 0.0260** 0.0400*** 0.0363** 
 (0.0112) (0.0197) (0.0136) (0.0202) (0.0122) (0.0137) (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0131) (0.0144) 
D(Log(Unexpected Government Expenditure),t-1) -0.00515 0.0139*** -0.0103 0.0203 0.00183 -0.0214 -0.00226 -0.00592 -0.00339 -0.0184 
 (0.00879) (0.00482) (0.0142) (0.0149) (0.00754) (0.0162) (0.0122) (0.0123) (0.00908) (0.0156) 
D(Log(Unexpected Government Expenditure),t-2) 0.0109 0.00610 0.0195 0.0378*** 0.00169 0.0134*** 0.0101 0.00648 0.00870 -0.00211 
 (0.00719) (0.00854) (0.0244) (0.0143) (0.00664) (0.00171) (0.00785) (0.00701) (0.00965) (0.00627) 
D(Log(Unexpected Government Expenditure),t-3) 0.0189 0.0390*** 0.0166 0.0329*** 0.0175 0.0176* 0.0377*** -0.00325 0.00266 0.0313*** 
 (0.0119) (0.0100) (0.0210) (0.00918) (0.0144) (0.00903) (0.0107) (0.0156) (0.0134) (0.00943) 
D(Log(Unexpected Government Expenditure),t-4) 0.0253*** 0.0290*** 0.0329* 0.0388 0.0271*** 0.0147* 0.0307*** 0.0214*** 0.0347*** 0.0119 
 (0.00416) (0.00990) (0.0195) (0.0276) (0.00690) (0.00780) (0.00980) (0.00314) (0.00532) (0.00933) 
Control for Taxes (up until the lag 4) and for the Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 482 179 237 77 262 220 267 215 254 228 
Number of countries 11 4 7 2 6 5 6 5 6 5 
Log Likelihood 1942 752.0 1028 286.4 1116 843.3 1098 851.6 996.4 931.0 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Total government expenditure captures the discretionary component of government spending (the residuals 
of equation (3)). Standard errors are corrected using the Jackknife resampling procedure. We control for Real GDP and for Taxes up until the lag 4 (the full table is reported in 
Appendix as Table A.4). 
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Table 10: Fiscal multipliers when accounting for CEEC’ structural characteristics (PMG) 
Multiplier Impact Std dev Cumulative Std dev 
Full model 0.09*** 0.02 0.21** 0.07 
Exchange Rate Regime     
Pegged 0.11** 0.04 0.32*** 0.05 
Intermediate 0.07** 0.03 0.20 0.15 
Floating 0.13** 0.05 0.46*** 0.04 
Level of Economic Development     
Low income 0.11*** 0.02 0.22** 0.06 
High income 0.05 0.03 0.11 0.07 
Level of Debt-to-GDP Ratio     
Low debt 0.10*** 0.02 0.28*** 0.07 
High debt 0.06** 0.02 0.10 0.06 
Openness Degree     
Low openness 0.11*** 0.02 0.26** 0.07 
High openness 0.08** 0.03 0.13 0.09 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Let us first focus on the type of the exchange rate regime. As shown by Table 10, the ERR 
does not seem to matter for the impact response of output to changes in fiscal policy: impact 
multipliers equal 0.11, 0.07 and 0.13, respectively. On the contrary, cumulative multipliers 
are highly sensitive to the ERR. For example, on the one hand, the cumulated response of 
output is 0.32 for pegged ERR, compared to statistically 0 (i.e. not significant) for 
intermediate ERR, consistent with the Mundell-Fleming model and previous evidence of 
more effective fiscal stimulus under pegged regimes in developed countries (Born et al., 
2013). On the other hand, the cumulated fiscal multiplier for floating ERR equals 0.46, and is 
equally higher than for intermediate ERR, consistent yet again with evidence for developed 
countries (Monacelli and Perotti, 2010, Ramey, 2011).12 These results asserting that corner 
(namely, pegged and flexible) ERR perform better than intermediate ERR when it comes to 
fiscal multipliers seem to suggest that the weak credibility of intermediate ERR in CEEC in 
our sample reduces the efficiency of fiscal policy. 
Second, using median income as cut-off, Table 10 shows that the multiplier is 
sensitive to the level of economic development. Specifically, both impact and cumulative 
multipliers are significant only in low-income, relative to high-income CEEC. Thus, our 
findings suggest the presence of growth-effects of fiscal policies in less developed CEEC. 
                                                           
12
 Albeit inconsistent with the predictions of the Mundell-Fleming model, this result meets some recent findings 
in the literature on developed countries; for example, Corsetti et al. (2012) explain that an expansionary fiscal 
policy can be associated with a real depreciation of the currency, thus boosting economic activity. For a recent 
discussion of heterogeneities related to the exchange rate regime in CEEC, see Josifidis et al. (2013). 
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Third, to account for a potential role of the fiscal stance, we compute multipliers for 
CEEC with relatively low and high debt-to-GDP ratios, respectively. Result in Table 10 
display impact multipliers of 0.10 and 0.06, and cumulative multipliers of 0.28 and 
statistically 0 for CEEC with low and high debt, respectively. Thus, our findings mirror the 
recent literature emphasizing nonlinear effects of fiscal policy on economic growth in a 
context of relatively high public debt,13 and defend sound macroeconomic environments (and 
particularly, low debt) as a tool for reinforcing the efficiency of fiscal-policy-based measures 
for supporting economic growth. 
Finally, we use the level of exports in percentage of GDP to divide CEEC between 
countries with low and high openness degree, respectively. As this was the case for the ERR, 
the openness degree is not found to influence the effects of fiscal policy on impact. On the 
contrary, cumulative multipliers are significant only in relatively less open CEEC (0.26, 
against statistically 0 in relatively more open CEEC), consistent with the predictions of the 
conventional Mundell-Fleming model. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Despite an impressive strand of literature estimating fiscal multipliers in developed countries, 
evidence for developing and emerging countries remains remarkably scarce. This paper 
provides new insights into how fiscal stimulus affects the output in 11 emerging Central and 
Eastern European Countries, based on a rather different methodological approach. Indeed, if 
most studies draw upon VAR models, we use a Panel Vector Error Correction model, selected 
for its particularly appealing features when it comes to CEEC: on the one hand, it allows 
accounting for their common long-run path, supported by their integration in the E(M)U, and, 
on the other hand, it permits computing different short-run dynamics in an integrated 
framework that controls for their common long-run path. In addition, we pay special attention 
to identifying truly exogenous shocks, through implementing an econometric procedure 
together with using genuine quarterly data. 
Estimations performed over the period 1999q1-2013q3 unveil the following results. 
First, fiscal multipliers are positive and significant for CEEC, albeit with important 
differences between impact and four-quarter cumulative multipliers. Second, country-specific 
multipliers are heterogeneous across CEEC, in sign, significance, and magnitude. Third, 
                                                           
13
 Such nonlinear effects of fiscal policy on growth in high-debt contexts are emphasized by Minea & Parent 
(2012) and Egert (2015) in developed countries, and by Eberhardt & Presbitero (2013) and Kourtellos et al. 
(2013) in developing countries. In addition, fiscal multipliers were also find to decline in developed countries, 
but above higher debt thresholds, namely 60% (Ilzetzki et al., 2013) or 100% (Corsetti et al., 2012). 
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impact and cumulative fiscal multipliers are strongly sensitive to CEEC’ characteristics. In 
particular, we find significant multipliers in CEEC with fixed or floating ERR, in less 
developed CEEC, in the CEEC with relatively low public debt-to-GDP ratios, and in 
relatively less open CEEC. 
These results have important policy implications. On the one hand, our findings 
suggest that a strategy for improving the growth effects for fiscal policy in small open CEEC 
is to move towards extreme ERR. This is a particularly appealing finding, since some CEEC 
already integrated the euro zone, and the remaining should perform structural reforms that 
would allow them to join the euro zone in the future, including more fixity in their exchange 
rate arrangements. On the other hand, conditionally upon a sound fiscal stance, our paper 
makes the case for fiscal policies as a device for supporting economic growth in less 
developed CEEC, thus improving the convergence process among them. 
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(TO BE PUBLISHED EXCLUSIVELY AS ELECTRONIC SUPPLEMENTARY 
MATERIAL) 
 
Table A.1a: List of countries 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia 
 
Table A.1b: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Observations Mean Standard Dev Min Max 
Real GDP 482 1.59e+08 1.78e+08 1.68e+07 8.76e+08 
Government expenditure 482 6.75e+07 7.19e+07 7246924 4.21e+08 
Tax revenues 482 1.91e+07 2.25e+07 1757586 1.16e+08 
Real exchange rate 482 101.3819 11.21874 69.44 135.55 
Central government debt (% GDP) 429 29.68998 18.11024 1 81 
Export of goods & services (% GDP) 482 55.67858 16.1442 23.62175 89.89667 
 
Table A.2a: Summary statistics of government expenditure in % of GDP (by country) 
  Mean Std Dev 
Full model 42.79962 6.02706 
Bulgaria 39.34807 7.50139 
Croatia 44.42253 3.09011 
Czech Republic 46.89297 3.09541 
Estonia 47.13088 4.45549 
Hungary 43.43218 5.52663 
Latvia 44.40612 6.04969 
Lithuania 41.18482 4.95491 
Poland 38.35802 5.01909 
Romania 39.54567 5.12169 
Slovakia 44.36725 7.31942 
Slovenia 42.85272 2.58801 
 
Table A.2b: Summary statistics of government expenditure in % of GDP (by category) 
  Mean Std Dev 
Full model 42.79962 6.02706 
Pegged regime 42.82518 5.972292 
Intermediate regime 45.07149 5.150866 
Floating regime 39.68591 4.971359 
Low income 42.77994 5.701126 
High Income 42.82263 6.395615 
Low Debt 43.80545 5.278542 
High Debt 42.79962 6.02706 
Low Openness 40.65295 5.876038 
High Openness 45.20631 5.239712 
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Table A.3: CEEC’ ERR classification based on Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) 
Code Fine classification Coarse classification Countries 
1 No separate legal tender   Bulgaria, Estonia 
2 Pre announced peg or currency board Pegged Lithuania, Slovenia 
4 De facto Peg    
8 De facto crawling band that is narrowed than or equal to+/-2%   Croatia, Czech Republic 
9 Pre announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2%  Hungary, Latvia 
10 De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-5% Intermediate Slovakia 
11 Moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%  Slovenia 
 
(i.e., allows for both appreciation and depreciation over time) 
   
12 Managed floating Floating Poland, Romania 
14 Freely falling   




Table A.4: PMG estimates of the effect of unexpected government spending on output when accounting for CEEC’ structural characteristics (full Table 9) 
  Exchange Rate Regime (ERR) Level of income Public debt (% of GDP) Openness degree 
  
Full 
model Pegged Intermediate Floating Low High Low High Low High 
Long Run                     
Log(Real GDP)           
Error correction term -0.0375* -0.0121 -0.182** 0.0452 -0.0260 -0.170*** -0.0766 -0.0905** 0.0101 -0.125 
 (0.0220) (0.0414) (0.0751) (0.0769) (0.0328) (0.0551) (0.0845) (0.0418) (0.00907) (0.0777) 
Log(Total Government Expenditure) 0.829*** 1.146*** 0.772*** 0.809*** 0.899*** 0.130*** 0.677*** 0.281*** 2.779 0.581*** 
 (0.0652) (0.107) (0.0314) (0.114) (0.0559) (0.0502) (0.0373) (0.0918) (1.827) (0.0615) 
Log(Tax revenues) -0.231*** -0.517*** 0.272*** 0.258** -0.289*** 0.736*** 0.332*** 0.611*** -1.872 0.405*** 
 (0.0763) (0.110) (0.0235) (0.123) (0.0670) (0.0456) (0.0293) (0.0961) (1.975) (0.0470) 
Short Run           
D(Log(Real GDP))           
D(Log(Real GDP),t-1) 0.626*** 0.506*** 0.614*** 0.603*** 0.524*** 0.751*** 0.619*** 0.628*** 0.668*** 0.691*** 
 (0.0701) (0.0671) (0.0859) (0.0298) (0.0736) (0.104) (0.0685) (0.123) (0.0426) (0.0978) 
D(Log(Real GDP),t-2) -0.183* -0.0701 -0.217** -0.0848 -0.0811 -0.228 -0.114 -0.248 -0.179 -0.169 
 (0.0962) (0.207) (0.0924) (0.341) (0.128) (0.147) (0.128) (0.202) (0.180) (0.132) 
D(Log(Real GDP),t-3) 0.216*** 0.0873 0.306*** 0.179 0.148 0.296*** 0.136* 0.430*** 0.310*** 0.174** 
 (0.0681) (0.161) (0.0762) (0.140) (0.113) (0.0360) (0.0807) (0.103) (0.108) (0.0880) 
D(Log(Real GDP),t-4) -0.00700 0.162 -0.0195 0.221 0.0290 0.0589 0.144 -0.125** 0.00320 0.0446 
 (0.0781) (0.168) (0.160) (0.381) (0.132) (0.102) (0.124) (0.0511) (0.134) (0.108) 
D(Log(Unexpected Government Expenditure)) 0.0401*** 0.0510*** 0.0347** 0.0541*** 0.0479*** 0.0245* 0.0481*** 0.0260** 0.0400*** 0.0363** 
 (0.0112) (0.0197) (0.0136) (0.0202) (0.0122) (0.0137) (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0131) (0.0144) 
D(Log(Unexpected Government Expenditure),t-1) -0.00515 0.0139*** -0.0103 0.0203 0.00183 -0.0214 -0.00226 -0.00592 -0.00339 -0.0184 
 (0.00879) (0.00482) (0.0142) (0.0149) (0.00754) (0.0162) (0.0122) (0.0123) (0.00908) (0.0156) 
D(Log(Unexpected Government Expenditure),t-2) 0.0109 0.00610 0.0195 0.0378*** 0.00169 0.0134*** 0.0101 0.00648 0.00870 -0.00211 
 (0.00719) (0.00854) (0.0244) (0.0143) (0.00664) (0.00171) (0.00785) (0.00701) (0.00965) (0.00627) 
D(Log(Unexpected Government Expenditure),t-3) 0.0189 0.0390*** 0.0166 0.0329*** 0.0175 0.0176* 0.0377*** -0.00325 0.00266 0.0313*** 
 (0.0119) (0.0100) (0.0210) (0.00918) (0.0144) (0.00903) (0.0107) (0.0156) (0.0134) (0.00943) 
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D(Log(Unexpected Government Expenditure),t-4) 0.0253*** 0.0290*** 0.0329* 0.0388 0.0271*** 0.0147* 0.0307*** 0.0214*** 0.0347*** 0.0119 
 (0.00416) (0.00990) (0.0195) (0.0276) (0.00690) (0.00780) (0.00980) (0.00314) (0.00532) (0.00933) 
D(Log(Tax revenues)) 0.221*** 0.178*** 0.181*** 0.279*** 0.218*** 0.142*** 0.188*** 0.208*** 0.253*** 0.145*** 
 (0.0283) (0.0341) (0.0532) (0.0224) (0.0323) (0.0217) (0.0456) (0.0428) (0.0311) (0.0347) 
D(Log(Tax revenues),t-1) -0.00177 -0.0106 -0.0416 -0.000159 0.00391 -0.0586*** -0.0204 -0.0311 -0.0356 -0.0407 
 (0.0219) (0.0549) (0.0289) (0.0497) (0.0391) (0.0103) (0.0235) (0.0384) (0.0217) (0.0254) 
D(Log(Tax revenues),t-2) -0.0101 0.0226* -0.0831** -0.00679 0.0190 -0.0998*** -0.0160 -0.0430 -0.0214 -0.0447 
 (0.0177) (0.0127) (0.0360) (0.0557) (0.0200) (0.0275) (0.0318) (0.0510) (0.0439) (0.0353) 
D(Log(Tax revenues),t-3) 0.000766 0.0103 -0.0371 -0.0580*** 0.0292 -0.105*** -0.0261 -0.0594 -0.0505 -0.0139 
 (0.0243) (0.0570) (0.0456) (0.0106) (0.0416) (0.0220) (0.0421) (0.0438) (0.0328) (0.0402) 
D(Log(Tax revenues),t-4) 0.00451 -0.0291 -0.0670 -0.0985 -0.00281 -0.0760 -0.105*** 0.0239 -0.0304 -0.0474 
 (0.0292) (0.0537) (0.0679) (0.114) (0.0428) (0.0564) (0.0392) (0.0317) (0.0461) (0.0641) 
Constant 0.294* 0.0744 0.0771**  0.187 0.737*** 0.0901 0.326** 0.358 0.208 
 (0.169) (0.272) (0.0314)  (0.238) (0.238) (0.0984) (0.153) (0.314) (0.131) 
Observations 482 179 237 77 262 220 267 215 254 228 
Number of countries 11 4 7 2 6 5 6 5 6 5 
Log Likelihood 1942 752.0 1028 286.4 1116 843.3 1098 851.6 996.4 931.0 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Total government expenditure captures the discretionary component of government spending (the residuals 
of equation (3)). Standard errors are corrected using the Jackknife resampling procedure. 
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Table A.5: MG country-estimates of the effect of public spending on output 
  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Short run coefficient by country   
Dependent variable: GDP per capita growth Bulgaria Croatia Czech R. Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia 
Log(Real GDP)                       
Log(Total Government Expenditures) 6.860 0.937*** 0.620*** 0.599 0.280** -0.876** 0.722*** 0.270** -0.175 0.794*** 0.805*** 
 (20.72) (0.327) (0.0785) (0.520) (0.125) (0.420) (0.165) (0.132) (0.307) (0.243) (0.236) 
Log(Taxes revenues) -5.958 -0.467 0.375*** 0.208 0.821*** 2.487*** 0.263 0.614*** 1.044*** 0.476** -0.878*** 
  (19.73) (0.689) (0.0602) (0.582) (0.133) (0.587) (0.285) (0.139) (0.367) (0.224) (0.257) 
Error correction term 0.0159 -0.0880* -0.415*** -0.0775 -0.362*** -0.0935*** -0.160*** -0.216** -0.235* -0.153*** -0.0832** 
 (0.0511) (0.0467) (0.114) (0.0740) (0.110) (0.0259) (0.0606) (0.0866) (0.142) (0.0559) (0.0396) 
D(Log(Real GDP))            
D(Log(Real GDP),t-1) 0.638*** 0.262 0.893*** 0.370* 0.749*** 0.619*** 0.531*** 0.327 0.674*** 0.712*** 0.351** 
 (0.150) (0.194) (0.165) (0.197) (0.163) (0.165) (0.148) (0.203) (0.183) (0.186) (0.145) 
D(Log(Real GDP),t-2) -0.674*** -0.0644 -0.344 0.453* -0.0896 -0.104 0.0948 0.308 -0.463*** -0.414* -0.0798 
 (0.196) (0.189) (0.250) (0.239) (0.234) (0.181) (0.188) (0.245) (0.178) (0.213) (0.144) 
D(Log(Real GDP),t-3) 0.495*** 0.217 0.175 -0.138 0.392* 0.261 -0.0559 0.239 0.321 0.258 0.110 
 (0.183) (0.173) (0.232) (0.225) (0.217) (0.183) (0.186) (0.236) (0.223) (0.230) (0.139) 
D(Log(Real GDP),t-4) 0.515** -0.249** 0.0661 -0.240 0.0815 -0.136 0.0895 -0.155 0.580*** -0.214 0.489*** 
 (0.208) (0.119) (0.154) (0.241) (0.200) (0.161) (0.172) (0.160) (0.200) (0.180) (0.160) 
D(Log(Total Government Expenditures)) -0.0191 0.0595*** 0.0256 0.0516*** 0.00990 0.0509*** 0.0708*** 0.0437** -0.00569 0.00989 0.0665*** 
 
(0.0176) (0.0155) (0.0303) (0.0149) (0.0219) (0.0189) (0.0195) (0.0172) (0.0199) (0.0297) (0.0205) 
D(Log(Total Government Expenditures),t-1) -0.00853 -0.0170 -0.0611* 0.0196 -0.0162 0.0266 0.0292 0.0296 -0.0452** -0.0420* 0.0144 
 
(0.0174) (0.0195) (0.0352) (0.0163) (0.0242) (0.0239) (0.0251) (0.0192) (0.0207) (0.0231) (0.0234) 
D(Log(Total Government Expenditures),t-2) 0.0269** -0.00416 -0.0147 -0.00997 -0.00712 0.0368 0.0152 0.0193 0.0261 0.00564 0.00310 
 
(0.0132) (0.0259) (0.0339) (0.0162) (0.0230) (0.0245) (0.0262) (0.0207) (0.0232) (0.0290) (0.0224) 
D(Log(Total Government Expenditures),t-3) 0.000933 -0.0406* 0.0324 0.0510*** 0.0152 0.0215 0.0639*** 0.00967 0.0156 0.0156 0.0364* 
 
(0.0120) (0.0242) (0.0302) (0.0112) (0.0199) (0.0220) (0.0233) (0.0187) (0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0214) 
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D(Log(Total Government Expenditures),t-4) 0.0276*** 0.0150 -0.00851 0.0403*** 0.00393 0.0484*** 0.0520*** 0.0186 0.0364* 0.0277 -0.00741 
 
(0.00974) (0.0189) (0.0312) (0.0136) (0.0217) (0.0137) (0.0149) (0.0172) (0.0197) (0.0249) (0.0171) 
D(Log(Taxes revenues)) 0.0827* 0.359*** 0.0147 0.147*** 0.0655 0.0568 0.169** 0.232*** 0.111 0.0699 0.240*** 
 (0.0492) (0.0606) (0.0546) (0.0532) (0.102) (0.0685) (0.0782) (0.0637) (0.137) (0.0675) (0.0543) 
D(Log(Taxes revenues),t-1) -0.144** 0.142 -0.112** -0.0910* -0.0962 -0.168** 0.0191 -0.00654 -0.0718 -0.0343 0.0963 
 (0.0610) (0.0917) (0.0555) (0.0537) (0.0919) (0.0661) (0.0856) (0.0783) (0.124) (0.0788) (0.0591) 
D(Log(Taxes revenues),t-2) 0.0520 -0.0315 -0.116** 0.00156 -0.194** -0.0481 -0.0738 -0.125 -0.119 0.0225 -0.0146 
 (0.0696) (0.0872) (0.0570) (0.0617) (0.0959) (0.0627) (0.0907) (0.0810) (0.0957) (0.0767) (0.0722) 
D(Log(Taxes revenues),t-3) -0.0541 0.164** -0.0848 0.119* -0.217** -0.0790 -0.181** -0.142* -0.163* -0.00360 0.0581 
 (0.0691) (0.0725) (0.0524) (0.0615) (0.104) (0.0564) (0.0848) (0.0795) (0.0989) (0.0716) (0.0602) 
D(Log(Taxes revenues),t-4) -0.181** 0.145** -0.200*** 0.0845 -0.102 -0.123* -0.0429 -0.0747 -0.259*** 0.0987 -0.136** 
 (0.0727) (0.0740) (0.0627) (0.0595) (0.107) (0.0635) (0.0910) (0.0757) (0.0872) (0.0716) (0.0622) 
Constant 0.0655 0.849** 0.619*** 0.327 -0.0353 -0.525** 0.241 0.837** 1.099*** -0.486* 1.526*** 
 (0.415) (0.357) (0.201) (0.273) (0.343) (0.241) (0.230) (0.347) (0.398) (0.254) (0.578) 
Observations 482 482 482 482 482 482 482 482 482 482 482 
Log likelihood 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 
Number of countries 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Total government expenditure captures the discretionary component of government spending (the residuals 
of equation (3)). Standard errors are corrected using the Jackknife resampling procedure. 
 
